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SOME IMPLICATIONS OF PLURALISTIC IDEALISM FOR THE AIMS OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Submitted by

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OUTLINE.

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Introduction.

Philosophy is an attempt to view the universe synoptically, to take all the facts into account and to relate them as coherently as is possible with human limitations. No one thinker can compass all the facts of the universe. The philosopher must build upon the results of investigations in every field.

Special sciences are necessary and each must be master of the facts in its own field. Yet every department of knowledge is affected by all the other departments. No science can expect to understand its own group of facts completely if it has no knowledge of other fields. To gain this knowledge it must draw upon the conclusions of others who are experts in their own lines of investigation. All practical sciences are concerned with the meaning of their facts for life, and even the pure sciences find their ultimate values in the same way. In other words every scientist must know his own field; what other fields mean for his; and what his field means for the rest of life. Philosophy aims to relate these many fields into a coherent interpretation of the universe as a whole.

Religious education is one of the special sciences and it is the purpose of this thesis to evaluate from the standpoint of philosophy the aims which have been adopted by this science. The first step will be a brief summary of the aims of religious education. The second step will be the consideration of various world views in the attempt to ascertain the most coherent interpretation of the universe as a whole. The final problem will be the evaluation of religious education in the light of the philosophy which we have adopted.

I. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.

Religious education has been defined by Dr. Athearn as the "motivation of conduct in terms of a religious ideal of life".[1] Elsewhere he has defined Christian education as "the introduction of control into experience in terms of the ideals of Jesus Christ".[2] In doing this religious education is using the methods of general education but its goal is more inclusive. In the words of Horne, "Religious education is general education conscious of its true goal".[3]

A. The Religious Education Movement.

Religious education is both as ancient as religion and as recent as the last decade. Wherever there has been religion there has been the constant necessity of teaching it to the younger generation. The Ethiopian's demand for someone to explain the mysterious words of the prophet is but an example of the need of every individual for a teacher. Experience is a great teacher, but experience needs guidance if it is to be wide and varied. There has been a tendency to acknowledge the importance of trained leadership in the field of general education but to deny or minimize it in religious education. This has arisen in part as a result of the view that religious knowledge is revealed to every person in its perfect and completed form. But is this true? A serious study of the facts does not seem to point in this direction. Persons

1 National System of Education, p. 30.
2 Lectures, 1924.
3 Encyclopedia of Sunday Schools, p. 900.

have the capacity for religious development but they have to learn the facts for themselves. It has been recognized in practice even where it has not been recognized in theory, and we have always had, in our homes and churches, training in matters of religion. There is, however, a great difference in the kind of religious instruction given at different periods.

The teachings of Jesus included two fundamental principles: knowledge of God and right relations to him; and right social living. All his sermons and stories stress these two ideas. He adopted the teaching method and worked persistently with a small group, endeavoring to instil these principles past all forgetting.

But did the Christian church follow the example of its founder in this? Not for very long. It soon made dogma and doctrine the major part and grew away from the simple, homely teachings of Jesus about God and fellowmen. Different interpretations and accounts of Jesus were given and a bitter struggle resulted in the formation of sects. Religious education then became the teaching of the beliefs of one's own sect and warnings against the heresies of others. We are still suffering from the outcomes of this teaching.

The movement seems at present to be turning back again to the experience of the individual with a new recognition of his religious and social needs. Religious education of the twentieth century is directed away from dogma and differences, and toward spiritual development and social unity. The emphasis is not merely on religious knowledge, which tends to

become barren intellectualism, but on religious life which is dynamic experience in all its richness and inclusiveness, based on knowledge but not completely exhausted by it.

The religious education movement is struggling through the transition from the Sunday school to the church school and the change is significant. The Sunday school stood for a definite type of Biblical instruction under the illusion that by knowledge are men saved. It has done a splendid service in spite of the handicaps of its methods and aim. Its teachers had a fairly thorough preparation of Bible study but little or no training in methods of presenting the truths thus gained to the child. As time went on leaders began to realize that other needs of the children and young people should be met. Devotional societies were formed to provide an opportunity for religious self-expression; missionary societies to capture and train social impulses; and finally clubs and organizations to meet recreational needs. The result was naturally confusion, overwork of leaders, divided loyalties, and unhealthy competition. No one can serve four or five organizations successfully. Either he will give half-hearted allegiance to all or he will choose one and forget all the others.

The reaction was inevitable. A few far-sighted people had the temerity to suggest that all these organizations be united into a church school which should provide a four-fold program for the youth of the community. Under this new program every activity would be centered around a

single purpose and directed by the same corps of leaders. The activities would complement rather than overlap.

The church school includes more than the imparting of Biblical information. It is a school for training in religion and the Bible is the textbook par excellence, but other material may also be used and must be included if religion is to be developed fully. The school of the church must also train the leadership and membership of the church, even as the school of the state trains leaders and citizens for the state. For every need of the church there must be a corresponding department of training in the church school.

With such a program it is evident that the limited time on Sunday for such instruction will not be sufficient. It is the aim of religious educators to provide during the week a school where all Protestant children may learn together the common elements of religion and the principles and materials of worship. The Sunday period is conducted separately by the various denominations and is supposed to be devoted to worship and to instruction in the beliefs of that denomination. This program has not as yet been put into practice very widely but it seems to offer great possibilities especially in worship which has been much neglected because of the stress on instruction.

The public school is making steady progress, but it is leaving entirely to the church the cultivation of the religious nature of the child. It teaches the sciences but cannot go beyond empirical facts to meanings and fundamental values. It gives training in morals but it cannot give the

highest motivation to moral conduct for this must come from religion. If the spiritual life of the nation is to be built up it is evident that the church must accept the responsibility. No other group can or ought to accept it.

B. The Aims of Religious Education.

If our purpose is to be accomplished it will be well to make a preliminary statement of the aims of religious education which it is our intention to evaluate from the philosophical standpoint.

The ultimate aim of religious education must be determined by the ultimate interpretation of religion. "Religion is that type of personal life characterized by faith in and the feeling of dependence on God, and dominated by the will to cooperate with him in the conservation and increase of values."[1] Certain assumptions are made by religious education on the basis of such a definition: that there are persons; that they are dependent on God; that he is interested in the production of values; and that the highest duty of persons is cooperation with him in the growing life of value. Religion is based on the hypothesis that there is meaning in the universe, that purposes are being realized. Accepting for the time being such a view of religion, what will its aims be?

Two types of aims must be considered:[2] first, those immediate aims which guide and determine the everyday process of education; and second, those ultimate aims which are the

[1] Brightman, Lectures, 1924.
[2] The discussion of aims follows closely--Betts, How to Teach Religion, Ch. III; and Stout, Organization, Ch. III.

standards or goals toward which the whole activity is directed and by which it is tested. Stout suggests as an immediate inclusive objective the aim "to secure a continuous reconstruction of experience, with an increasing sense of spiritual values, a growing consciousness of God and Christ in the life, and an expanding disposition and ability to recognize and discharge one's obligation to God and to his (sic!) fellows."[1] The ultimate aim is, "Christian life and character expressing itself adequately in one's relations to God and to his fellows."[2]

The immediate aims deal with the preparatory processes which are expected to fit the individual for the ultimate goal. If we are to give training in religion it is certain that we must commence with the elemental facts of religious knowledge. These are the tools with which we shall later work. If a child is to be religious he must know, so far as he can understand, what religion is. This statement implies a grading of religious information to suit the needs and capacities of the individual.

But knowledge unapplied is of little value to anyone. To know what were good to do does not mean to do it. One of the most serious problems of the educator is the application of knowledge to conduct. It must, then, be the aim of religious education to find means and methods whereby knowledge may be put into practice in Christian living.

The method must be the creation of religious ideals and the motivation of life in terms of these ideals. Such

[1] Stout, Organization and Administration, p. 50.
[2] Ibid., p. 50.

motivation should involve the whole personality; intellect, emotion and will, working in perfect harmony.

The ultimate aim of religious education is the achieving of character, the building of personality. No religious education is successful which does not lead to the development of those sturdy Christian qualities which dominate and control individual choices and actions. One of the fundamental purposes of religious education is to be present at every stage in the development of the individual, giving at each step the training and guidance necessary to assure right choices and spiritual growth. Religious educators believe that those factors which lead to the need for evangelistic campaigns are unnecessary and should be eliminated as soon as possible. The ideal is constant and growing fellowship with God which will lead without break or struggle to conscious commitment of each life to his will.

Character cannot be built on any single value; it must be inclusive, taking into account all the factors of human life and developing them harmoniously and in proportion. If religious education is to teach the human race to live religiously it must involve at least a four-fold development.

The first essential in the building of character is physical well-being. This includes both health and purity. The latter is always recognized as necessary to religion but the former is often ignored. Many have even disparaged health and felt that feeble, wasted figures were a mark of extreme devotion to the things of the spirit. Extreme they are in

truth, but unintelligent and destructive of some of the greatest possibilities of religious service. Health is essential to successful work. It is also a social responsibility, both because disease is contagious and because ill-health is a social expense. Recreation is as much a part of physical development as work. It also has social values for recreation unshared soon loses its command on the interest.

Social cooperation is a keynote of the times. Science has shown that no man can live to himself alone. All are bound by countless ties to the social structure. Salvation is becoming a social as well as an individual obligation. This being the case it is necessary that people learn to live together religiously. The social sciences must become part of the education of every person. The state recognizes and fulfills this need; but the social ideal must find its ultimate justification in philosophy and religion. The conception of universal brotherhood grows naturally out of the religious teaching of the Fatherhood of God, and certain philosophies reach the same conclusion.

In some quarters at present there seems to be a tendency to underestimate the third factor in this scheme of character building, mental development. It is admitted that mere knowledge is practically useless. It is true that a man may be good and yet ignorant; but it is also true that he might be much better if he were more intelligent. It is the duty of every person to seek mental development within the limits of his capacity. It is the duty of society and of the church to see that he has both opportunity and direction.

In all of this we have not reached the heart of religious training which is spiritual insight. The roots and springs of character must come from knowledge of God and insight into his purpose for the world and for human beings. Intelligent church membership, social service, and physical culture are but by-products of the greater thing which is spiritual vision and cooperation with the will of God. Character without this is one-sided, self-willed, lacking in dynamic and purpose. This does not mean that we should choose that mystic contemplation which never comes back to the problems of real life; it rather involves what Hocking calls the principle of alternation between the spiritual and the mundane which links the actual and the ideal in a practical program of socio-spiritual activity. If religious education can achieve this aim it may rest assured that the other factors will follow.

These, briefly stated, seem to be the chief aims of religious education at the present time. Various schools lay emphasis on different elements and some would deny one or more of these. Many turn to details such as church union and special methods. It has seemed better to consider the more universal and permanent aims. It would be difficult to reach any more detailed list on which all would agree.

Our aims are stated but there is still a question. Much is assumed by these aims about the nature of God, human personality and values. In a day when behaviorist and humanist are receiving so much support are we right in laying

emphasis on personal development and a purposive universe? The results of the sciences seem to point toward the dependence of mind, whatever it may be, on body. We cannot deny the close relationship and our new knowledge of the body is helping us to a better understanding of some mental processes. We are able to predict more accurately in the mental realm and we may well wonder whether determinism is not true even here. Should we not then be aiming at the development of biological organisms in a mechanistic world? We must also ask whether religion is merely social. Social values and social obligations are compelling and universal. Is religion the social passion or is there some objective reality which assures the validity of our social ideals? These and similar questions can be answered only with the aid of philosophy. We must ask the question: What is the nature and meaning of the universe? Our answer will determine the validity of the aims of religious education.

II. THE NATURE OF ULTIMATE REALITY.

Metaphysics is the logical basis of all constructive thinking about religious questions. It seeks to discover what is the ultimate reality underlying the world which we experience. It would know whether reason and law are inherent in the ground of things, or whether irrationality and chaos are the whence and whither of life. The meaning and value of the results of all thinking can be found satisfactorily only in an interpretation of ultimate reality. Our thinking on matters of religion must be submitted to the same tests as our other thinking. Religious education which is based on ultimate unreality cannot stand the test of time and use. This then is the question we would face: Is reality reasonable, and like mind, or is it something chaotic and incoherent? In other words, does philosophy make faith in God possible or impossible?

A. Kinds of Ultimate Reality.

Descartes, the first of the modern philosophers, set the problem in its present day form when he asked how many kinds of reality there are ultimately. There are three possible answers: monism, dualism, or pluralism. The monist would hold that there is ultimately only one kind of substance or being and that all we experience as different may finally be reduced to this one. Here we may classify most materialists and idealists. The dualist interprets reality as

fundamentally of two types, mind and matter, a sort of union of the two systems, idealism and materialism. Descartes subscribed to this view and a similar position is held by critical realists such as Pratt, and neo-scholastics like Mercier. Pluralism is the view that there are many irreducible kinds of ultimate reality. Modern neo-realists and pragmatists are definitely pluralistic.

B. A Critical Estimate of Monism.

Confronted by these conflicting views we may well ask what can be said in defense of each. Arguments for and against monism will bring out the truth and falsity of the other positions. What are the chief objections to viewing reality as ultimately one?

1. The Realistic Objection.

It is, in the first place, in opposition to our everyday interpretation of experience. It is not at all pleasing to the "man on the street" to hear that all the things which he sees as distinct and different are ultimately of one kind. But we cannot accept this view of the naive realist without attempting to examine it and see if it is the best solution.

There certainly is much of truth in this view. If we are to base our investigations on what we find in experience (and where else can we start?) then we must admit that there seem to be a least two very different kinds of stuff in the universe. There is matter which seems to be a closed system,

in which definite prediction is possible. It exists in a space-time world and operates according to mechanical laws. On the other hand there is mind which seems to be not material, not in space or time, not bound by mechanical laws, not predictable. Science deals with the whole material world as a common body of facts which are objectively observable. It also studies consciousness and its laws. The results of such study raise the problem how such different things can exist in the same world, and even more, how they can affect each other as experience seems to proclaim that they do.

Scientific analysis goes much further than the simple experiences of the naive realist and reveals matter, not as solid and subatantial, but as made up ultimately of electrons in motion. The laws which govern electrons seem to be mechanical and determined. Science in general has accepted this conclusion though some scientists are beginning to question it. It is much easier to formulate laws and predict the future in such a universe. Schiller raises the question whether this convenient mechanism is true even of the inorganic world.[1] The law of averages seems to allow for relative freedom in the organic world without destroying its predictability. Why might this not be even more possible in dealing with such minute particles as atoms and electrons? Our instruments are so crude that error cannot be avoided. "It is entirely possible that the world may now be, and may always have been, such as to contain a certain indetermination throughout its structure, which we have only failed to discover because we have closed our

1 Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p.412ff.

eyes to it, in order to have a more easily calculable universe."[1] Be that as it may, there remains the question of the relation between consciousness and the world of nature.

How can two such unlike factors as mind and matter work together in harmony? There must be some connection and yet they are entirely different in kind and in mode of expression. If the mechanical interpretation is final there can be no room for freedom; and even relative indeterminism does not account for interaction. Without it the two must remain forever separate and operate much as the Leibnizian monads in their preestablished harmony.

Reason, however, proclaims that when two things work together in parallel systems and in perfect harmony we should at least ask ourselves whether there may not be some connection between them. The uncritical man may say: Accept the two and admit interaction. The scientist and the logician join in stern rebuke. The former says that conservation of energy and mechanical law would be destroyed. The latter protests that it is illogical to say that absolutely separate things can affect each other. Granting this, we may adopt the materialistic solution and say with Hobbes that mind is only a refined form of motion.

2. Materialistic Monism.

Materialism is a monistic system. The inherent difficulty in dualistic systems has been well stated by Miss Calkins who says: "Granted that reality is of two fundamentally

[1] Ibid., p. 417.

unrelated kinds, spiritual and material, how does it happen that an individual of the one sort has an influence on an individual of the other? Why do material things affect mind so as to produce sensations, and why does mind induce voluntary movements in a body, if-as Descartes teaches-material substance is independent of any spiritual substance save only God? Must we not even ask how God, a spiritual substance, can create or influence material things, if spirits and material realities are totally unrelated? The difficulty thus involved in asserting on the one hand the unrelatedness, on the other the necessary relation, of minds and bodies, is the problem met by the systems of qualitative monism."[1] Materialism offers a system made up of one kind of being and governed by laws which can affect all parts of it. The mind demands unity but is the unity offered by this system sufficient?

To view all our experience as a mad race of particles through space is as unreasonable as to hold that it has nothing to do with matter and motion. The materialist explains mind wholly in terms of matter. He says that it is a form of body or that it is entirely due to physical things. This is far from being an explanation of consciousness. The laws of matter in motion certainly are not the same sort of laws that we find governing conscious experience. "Consciousness fills no space and cannot move in space, although it affects and is affected by "matter"; there is nothing in matter or its properties that can express what we mean by reason or purpose, choice or hope, value or self-experience. --- Naturalism, then, rests

[1] Calkins, Persistent Problems of Philosophy, p. 56.

on selected facts; it is an attempt to explain the whole of experience, including mind, in terms of a part, namely, a certain class of the objects of experience."[1] It omits facts which are necessary to an adequate conclusion.

3. Idealistic Monism.

The idealistic solution begins at a different point, or rather it defines its point of beginning more clearly. The materialist starts with the entire external world as he experiences it. The idealist starts with his own experience since he recognizes that this is all he can ever know immediately. I know my ideas about objects and other selves but I can never possibly get any knowledge of another self which is not my idea. This reasoning may lead to the view of solipsism, that nothing is metaphysically real which is beyond me. Solipsism is a denial that my ideas refer to an external reality, or at least that it is possible to give any account of reality. Such a conclusion would mean the giving up of the game of thought almost at the beginning but there seem to be facts which make such an abandonment unnecessary. It is perfectly true that all I know must be known through my ideas but this does not mean that I have to create those ideas. Any reasonable mind recognizes the difference between imagination and ordinary experience that refers to objects and other selves which are present to our senses. The former we find to be within our control; the latter is far from being so. Starting from what we know of ourselves, how can these experiences best be inter-

[1] Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 234.

preted? Not by saying that they are unreal, but by making synoptic hypotheses as to the type of reality they reveal and testing out these hypotheses, examining their inner coherence and their coherence with the rest of experience. If part of our experience is not subject to our wills, if we do not feel ourselves to be the creators of it, the most natural hypothesis would be that it is something other than our imagination but capable of being experienced by us. If in our experience we meet other selves we may assume that they are like us, but we must go beyond mere assumption and analyze each experience into its simplest elements to discover whether it is really like our own. But analysis is only half the story. We must reconstruct the whole and see it in relation to other wholes. Only through the synoptic vision can we determine whether our hypothesis leads to a coherent interpretation of experience. Such a method reveals, not that I am all that there is, but rather that all that there is is of the same sort of stuff, experience stuff, and selves who experience it; not that my little solipsistic orb embraces all that there is, but that the whole universe is patterned after the truth so vaguely and imperfectly revealed in me. This certainly is a more coherent and a more fruitful hypothesis than that of solipsism.

The view at which we are arriving is monistic but qualitatively mental rather than material. It maintains not only the reality of consciousness but also the ideality of physical things. This is based on the Berkeleyan contention that all we know of an object is expressible in mental terms. Both

primary and secondary qualities have meaning only for minds, and what right have we to assert that anything which has no meaning, about which we can assert nothing, exists?

Not only this, but nothing can be known to exist apart from some mind. We can have no experience of anything except sensations and ideas. Material things as solid and substantial are absolutely unknowable. We must find a way in which these things, admittedly ideal in nature, can be interpreted coherently. How do they happen to exist at all? Why do most minds experience them in about the same way? A single individual may experience a part of the universe and it becomes real for him as part of his experience but how is it to be interpreted coherently when he is not experiencing it? Certainly there is no guarantee of uniformity in the world of nature if each individual must create it for himself. Things can exist only for persons and yet they seem to have a permanence and stability which finite selves could not give them. According to Berkeley things exist only as they are known, and yet it is impossible to build up a coherent world merely on the perceptions of finite individuals. Materialism, with its laws of matter in motion, has given a partial account of things but has failed to explain mind. Yet the universe seems to be mind-wise not motion-mad. Berkeley meets the difficulty in the statement that God exists as the cause of our ideas and as their perceiver when we are not perceiving them. The whole realm of nature is his continuous experience and the problem of materialism is thus solved by turning it into idealism. The physical world can be understood and experienced by minds because it is

itself the experience of a Supreme Mind. If Berkeley's argument be true then we must cease to contend for things which are utterly other than consciousness.

A study of the nature of personality gives another clue to the meaning and unity of the universe. I, as a limited self, could not possibly reach out beyond myself to a world of other selves and physical things if solipsism were the truth. I could not communicate with other selves, nor could I know anything which was not my own creation. But my experience tells me that I do communicate with other persons; that I can both use and understand physical things; and that I can know a world of ideals and possibilities which I only partially attain. How is this possible? Rashdall develops the idea that it is irrational to suppose minds and bodies which work together with a fair degree of harmony to be of utterly different origin and independent.[1] Here we have the reverse of the previous argument that interaction of unlikes is unreasonable. We seem to experience ourselves as unique, independent individuals and yet how does it happen that we inhabit bodies and get along fairly well with a material world which we have found to be the experience of God? It seems reasonable to come to the same conclusion which we reached in regard to things, namely, that we also are dependent on God for our existence. This preserves a unified view of the universe as a great whole. God is that whole and persons and things are parts of his experience. Just what this dependence means and how far it is to go we have still to discover, and on the discovery must rest our interpretation of God.

[1] Rashdall, "Personality: Human and Divine." in Sturt, Personal Idealism, p. 381.

The trend of thought is away from a piecemeal view of the world and toward a union of the many parts into a meaningful whole. Organic logic rather than analytic gives the most coherent interpretation of experience. The mind acts as a whole and the various parts of its experience have significance only as they are related to the rest of experience. True, we can analyze our experiences much as we analyze our dreams, and find the source of the various parts, but the meaning is not clear until it is related to the experiencer as a living whole. The mere fact that I perceive a green book may mean much or nothing. If it is an unfamiliar book it is certainly an insignificant part of my experience. If on the other hand it is a book whose pages are alive with thoughts that I have mastered and made my own then it is a vital part. Gentile says[1] that the author lives in the mind of the reader and that there is in a book only what the reader gets out of it. It is interpreted by each in the light of all that he has previously built into himself. Tennyson's Ulysses says: "I am a part of all that I have met." But even more truly, all that I have met is part of me. I am the synthesizer that unites the many fragments of experience into a worthful whole. The fragments have no importance till they are related and interpreted. Gentile is right.

But whither is this leading us? Is the whole the only true reality? It would seem to be so if our process of reasoning thus far is correct. We have found that physical things are meaningless apart from minds, and that they find their meaning only when related to each other in the unified experience of

[1] Gentile, The Reform of Education.

the Supreme Mind. We have at least raised the question whether the same may not be true of persons. This problem we shall now consider.

C. Absolute Idealism.

Absolute idealism develops the view that finite selves find their meaning only in relation to a Supreme Mind. They are true parts of the experience of the Absolute and have no existence or meaning apart from it.

1, The Values of Unity.

The fundamental thought of this system is the unity of all experience in the Absolute. The finite self, the absolutist says, is full of limitations, yet it is the only key we have to what really is; therefore we must search out its implications. Here we go beyond the realm of naive experience to that of coherent thought. How can we give the most reasonable account of all our experience? Certainly coherence must be a mind-like quality and if our finite minds point to an ideal of perfect coherence, is it not rational to suppose that ultimate reality must realize this ideal and be perfect coherence? If it is perfect it must transcend all the failures and errors to which we are subject. If only the whole is real then the parts must derive their entire meaning from their relation to the whole. Persons, as well as things, are parts of the Absolute, dependent upon it for their existence and value.

This certainly offers a unified system and an organic logic, but is it true to all the facts? The only facts we have

are those of experience. Can they be fully interpreted in terms of an Absolute? There are very serious difficulties in such a view.

2. Problems which Remain.

In the first place I do not experience myself as being a part of any other self. Experience is private and it is contrary to the whole idea of personality that anyone else should ever have my experience as I experience it. The absolutist says that all I experience is part of the Absolute's experience. But the problems of ignorance and error arise. How can the Absolute include either of these genuine parts of my experience? He can know about my error, but he who knows the truth cannot possibly have the baffling experience of partial knowledge which is mine. The absolutist says that these are included but transcended by the Absolute and that, without him, there could be no truth or error. This is one escape, but it is an escape by denial rather than by explanation.

Absolutism must account for finite selves with their error and partiality and yet their experience of individuality. As a part of the Absolute I can have no meaning in myself, no initiative, no self-direction; and yet these are all characteristics which my experience leads me to think I do possess. Schiller humorously suggests a possible escape for absolutism from the standpoint of abnormal psychology. A catastrophe or a period of morbid reflection may result in the breaking up of a normal mind into one or more divided personalities all inhabiting the same body but existing as absolutely private

thought lives or communicating much as one person does to another. The famous case of 'Miss Beauchamp' is an instance in point. Such a theory, carried over into absolutism would hold that finite persons are the result of the dissociation of the Absolute. "On this theory all existences would be secondary personalities of the one Absolute, differing infinitely in their contents, character, and capacity, and capable of co-existence and concurrent manifestation to a much greater extent than were the members of the 'Beauchamp' family, in which this power was possessed only by Sally."[1] 'Miss Beauchamp' reachieved unity through the aid of Dr. Prince but, Schiller points out there would be no such possibility for the Absolute since there is nothing outside it to perform the cure. It must forever say: "I have too many selves to know the one." The novelty of this solution is recognized by Schiller and he says: "It is a little startling, e.g., at first to have to think of the Absolute as morbidly dissociated or even as downright mad." but, as he humorously adds, "If the Absolute is to include the whole of a world which contains madness, it is clear that, anyhow, it must, in a sense be mad."[2] The theory is ingenious but why interpret the universe in terms of what is recognized as abnormal and exceptional? Certainly, as Schiller shows, this should be accepted only after all other solutions have failed.

Other problems are raised by the view that my experience <u>is</u> the experience of the Absolute. In such a case my consciousness is absolutely determined by the will of the Absolute. There is always the feeling that the individual may

[1] Schiller, <u>Studies in Humanism</u>, p. 270.
[2] <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 273.

choose between alternatives, but such a feeling must be an illusion. Mechanical necessity rather than choice and initiative must be the verdict.

The problem of evil is ever present. The absolutist may solve it in either of two ways. He may say that there is no evil. What seems so is mere error of mortal mind, due to our limited perspective. The Absolute includes the universe within himself. He is perfect and it, as part of him, must also be perfect. Finite beings have no real freedom for how can the part act independently of the whole? Evil, true though it may seem to us, is in reality only an illusion. God, who sees a whole life, knows that an act which is wrong for the individual will make his later life better because of the strength which it takes to conquer that one sin. This may be true in some instances but are we to say: Sin in order that you may have something to conquer? Again, God who sees life in its larger terms may know that one man's sinful life will lead to good in the lives of others. Is that life to be called good because of its results? Most certainly not! Evil must remain evil no matter what its final outcome may be. This view approaches the attitude of the mystic, and says that if you can lose yourself in the Infinite, evil and pain will be transformed into something beautiful and good.

The other view is that evil is essential to the perfection of the whole. It says that finite individuals must suffer and sin in ways that they do not understand in order that the Absolute may reach perfection in himself. Royce develops this view that God needs struggle in order to be a moral being.[1]

[1] Studies in Good and Evil, pp. 1-28.

In my sin and suffering God suffers also and my sin is partial defeat for him though only temporary. To think that God is suffering with me and with all other human beings may be a comfort to me. His suffering must be far greater than mine; quantitatively, because he has to suffer with all humanity, and, qualitatively, because he sees so much deeper into the meaning of life and its possibilities. But it seems to me that this view is not consistent with the fundamental principles of absolutism. If God is all that there is and perfect wherein is the necessity of all this suffering and sin?

What about finite beings in a universe so completely determined? Moral conduct is possible only for free beings. If man is a completely determined part of the whole, of course freedom is impossible. Some absolutists deny the possibility of freedom; others, like Miss Calkins, admit it and try to prove its possibility on the basis of statistical as opposed to rigid mathematical law.[1] The attempt is dangerous to absolutism and scarcely convincing.

Absolute idealism gives unity and system to our thought and includes the truths of idealism. It is, however, an unsatisfactory account of personality for it denies the unity and privacy of finite consciousness. It makes freedom impossible and solves the problem of evil by denying it or making it necessary to the character of the Absolute. Recognizing all these difficulties can we say that absolute idealism offers the most coherent view of the world that is possible? It certainly is truer than the dualistic systems and materialism, but is there not a better solution?

[1] Persistent Problems of Philosophy, p. 474.

D. Pluralistic Idealism.

To many minds the solution given by pluralistic idealism is more satisfactory than that of monistic idealism. By pluralistic idealism we mean that view which holds that there are many relatively independent selves, and that there is nothing in the universe except these selves and their experience. The view is qualitatively idealistic but numerically pluralistic. There are three distinct types of pluralistic idealism: the Atheistic pluralism of McTaggart; the ethical individualism of Howison; and the theistic pluralism of Lotze, Ladd, Ward and Bowne.

1. Atheistic Pluralism.

The argument for pluralism is taken up by McTaggart at the point where absolute idealism leaves it. McTaggart is an interpreter of Hegel and in close sympathy with him though he finds the logic of Hegel pointing to numerical pluralism rather than monism. The pluralism of McTaggart avoids many of the difficulties of Hegelian monism.

McTaggart holds that the universe is ultimately spiritual in nature and that it is made up of many separate and distinct individuals. This 'community of selves' makes up the whole of reality. The Absolute is all-inclusive and there is nothing which can exist outside of it. But the Absolute is not to be thought of as personal for this involves essential contradictions, as we have seen in our previous discussion. Not only are the problems of privacy and ignorance unsolved, but

McTaggart points out new difficulties. Self is an indivisible unity of consciousness but the Absolute cannot be such a unity for it is divisible into innumerable persons. "If the Absolute had a consciousness of self, that consciousness could not fall outside the finite persons. For then those persons would not fully manifest the Absolute. --- And the self-consciousness of the Absolute, again, cannot be in each differentiation separately, for then it would be identical with the self-consciousness of each finite person, and the Absolute, as a unity, would have no self-consciousness at all. But the only remaining alternative is that the self-consciousness of the Absolute is the unity of its differentiations."[1] McTaggart rightly admits that there is no meaning to self-consciousness which has reality only in relation to its parts and which is nothing apart from them.

Some have objected to this on the ground that it is of the character of selfhood to bring together the varied parts of experience into an essential unity, and that the Absolute is such a unity, since it is a 'spiritual unity' of the many finite persons. McTaggart shows that this objection carried out to its logical implications would involve the necessity of calling every spiritual unity, from clubs to football teams, a person.[2] This leads to confusion rather than clarity in the use of the term 'person'.

It is evident, according to McTaggart, that the Absolute, though a spiritual unity, is not personal. A further difficulty arises from speaking of the Absolute as God. The term

[1] Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, p. 85.
[2] Ibid., p. 86.

'God' in common parlance has a personal meaning. Confusion must follow any attempt to identify the Absolute with God if reality as a whole is, as he says, impersonal.[1]

The Absolute is, then, a community of interdependent selves. These selves have significance only in their relation to the whole, but the relation is reciprocal for the whole has meaning only when related to the individuals of which it is composed. The whole is merely the sum of its parts and would have no meaning, no existence, alone. The interaction of the parts is essential in order that selves may define themselves. The problem of knowledge, according to McTaggart, leads to this conclusion. In order for the self to know itself there must be some object beyond it from which to distinguish itself. The fact of objective reference is fundamental. All experience which I have is my own experience yet I recognize that large parts of it refer to objects which are external to me. Like the monads of Leibniz, persons are centers of cognition for themselves but they also mirror the universe, though, unlike the monads, they are in relations with each other. When the cognition of the individual is perfect "his whole nature would consist in the conscious repreduction of the system of which he is a part."[2] "God is a community, and every man is part of it. In a perfect unity, such as God is, the parts are not subordinate to the whole. The whole is in every part, and every part is essential to the whole. Every man is thus a perfect manifestation of God. He would not be such a manifestation of God, indeed, if he were taken in isolation, but, being taken

[1] Ibid., p. 56ff.
[2] Ibid., p. 14.

in the community, he embodies God perfectly."[1] But is McTaggart right in saying that any part, even in social relations, could ever be a perfect representation of the whole? If the powers of cognition were perfect he might know the whole but he could not represent it in himself.

The problem of the origin of the many selves is not clearly answered by McTaggart, but the suggestion above that "every part is essential to the whole" points to the view of universal immortality which he adopts. The whole cannot remain perfect if parts are constantly being dropped out for no other individual can take the place of the one lost.

Any view of a personal God is, for McTaggart, incompatible with the community of selves or with the Absolute as sum of selves. All types of pluralistic idealism agree with McTaggart in the conclusion that God is not the community of selves or the Absolute as all that there is. They do not, however, find this a ground for the atheistic conclusion as does McTaggart. Their reasons for this difference will be considered later.

Be this as it may, there is still the problem of the character of the universe. Are goodness and reality synonymous or is reality indifferent or bad? McTaggart follows Hegel in the conclusion that the supreme good and the supreme reality are one, and that the supreme goal of conduct is the complete realization of the absolute good.[2] The duty to realize the good would not, he holds, be lessened by the conclusion that there is no God. Virtue would be just as binding, right and

1 Ibid., p. 243.
2 Ibid., p. 99.

wrong just as clear. As Dr Brightman has put it: "Whether we believe in God or not, there is value and there is obligation. Whether God issues moral commandments or not, obligation is self-recognized and self-imposed."[1] McTaggart admits the changes which would probably be made in morality by atheism but endeavors to show that recognition of the responsibilities of membership in the community will take the place of divine sanctions in controlling conduct. There are other thinkers, however, who find the fact of moral obligation pointing directly to the existence of a personal God. Sorley presents this argument with great force.[2] Just as our sense-perceptions point to an objective physical world, so do our moral perceptions point to an objective moral order. Obligation can exist only in minds and it is reasonable to suppose that an objective moral order can exist only in a Supreme Mind. Such an argument is at least a partial refutation of McTaggart's atheism.

Even though the universe be good there still remains the question of the kind of goodness. Is it static or progressive? Is there a real directive agency in the universe, purposive, pointing toward ends? McTaggart seems to feel that there is some sort of purpose in reality which the many are trying to realize and yet how can there be teleology on a universal scale if there is no Supreme Mind? The many may combine efforts for the accomplishment of particular ends but no world purpose can be carried out by the mathematical sum of many parts. There is no guarantee that goodness and reality are in harmony though McTaggart says that practice and experience seem

1 Religious Values, p. 56.
2 Moral Values and the Idea of God. cf., Brightman, Religious Values, p. 63f.

to point in that direction. Nevertheless any moral relations which exist must be the result of the character of the individual members of the 'community'. Such relations are admitted but we still feel the need of some explanation. McTaggart finds that the facts of cognition do not account for them. Perfect volition leads to activity in accord with reason, but even this is not sufficient. There may be direct conflict between knowledge and will. The synthesis, he finds in the emotion of love which is the perfect balance of cognition and volition. Love is an attitude toward persons, and this fundamental love offers the key to the problems of social relations. Of course this is not the love of an impersonal Absolute nor of an equally impersonal humanity, but love of human persons, a dynamic bond which unites all into a community of love.[1]

The philosophy of McTaggart has certain very definite values. The universe is seen as a society of persons. The demands of finite selfhood for distinction and unique value are recognized. The view of an Absolute consciousness which is made up of other finite consciousnesses is successfully refuted. The binding character of moral obligation, regardless of the nature of the universe, is true to the facts of moral experience.

In spite of these values certain difficulties exist which make the system as a whole unsatisfactory. These center around the atheistic conclusion. If there is no Supreme Mind how is the natural order to be explained? We have found that it can be understood only as the experience of one Mind. And the question of the existence of the many persons is equally

[1] Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, Ch. IX.

difficult. To explain the universe as merely an aggregate leads, as Bowne says, back to "the impossible pluralism of uncritical speculation."[1] Unity is essentially a demand of the reason and, as Bowne further says, "only creation can reconcile the reality of the finite in this sense with the unity of the infinite".[2] Without God teleology is doubtful and certainly limited; the logical implications of ethics are unrecognized; immortality is bereft of its chief values and religion is godless. No system of atheism can meet the demands of experience.

The pluralism of McTaggart destroys the real unity of the universe by its denial of a Supreme Person. We need a system which will include the facts of finite selfhood and yet account for unity. The system of Howison professes to do this.

2. Ethical Individualism.

In common with most pluralistic idealism Howison's system starts with personal experience or knowledge of the self and of other selves. No amount of doubting can disprove my own existence for I know it with immediate certainty. The solution already sketched leads to knowledge of other selves whose experience is equally real. These many minds and their experiences are ultimately real or noumenal. Part of their experience is of the physical world and this must be interpreted. Things, for Howison, are thoroughly ideal. As discovered through sense-experience they are phenomenal and the creation of the experiencing minds. Reason, however, points to a noumenal existence.

[1] Metaphysics, p. 96.
[2] Ibid., p. 97.

It cannot be content with mere appearances but must posit an objective order behind the phenomena. Evolution, for Howison, reigns only in the realm of the phenomenal. It does not reach over into the realm of persons except as they are affected by the activities of phenomena in the process of development. Mind as noumenal, is not evolving. It is eternal and has no origin in time, but merely the logical one of reference to other selves and to God. Minds are members of an 'Eternal Republic' but, "in the literal sense of the word, they have no origin at all--no source in time whatever. There is nothing at all, prior to them, out of which their being arises; they are not things, in the chain of efficient causation. They simply are, and together constitute the eternal order."[1]

But who or what is God? Howison seems to follow the suggestion of Lotze in the closing pages of his Metaphysics that the beginning of all metaphysics is to be found in ethics. It is from the standpoint of ethical individualism that Howison approaches the solution of ultimate problems. Finite selves have been shown by immediate experience to be genuine existences. Having established the world of minds he must prove the existence of the Supreme Mind which is the Ideal or pattern for all lesser minds. His argument is the following:[2] The finite self-definer can define himself primarily only in distinction from the Ideal, and the Supreme Mind must find its complement in finite minds. Either both are real or neither has any reality. Instead of arguing from perfection to existence as Descartes did, Howison's argument is: "The idea of every self and the

[1] Howison, Limits of Evolution, p. xiv.
[2] Ibid., p. 355.

idea of God are inseparably connected, so that if any self exists, then God also must exist; but any and every self demonstrably exists, for (as apud Cartesium) the very doubt of its existence implies its existence; and therefore God really exists."[1] Howison ignores the fact that we shall later find in the philosophy of Lotze that persons have true being for self as well as being in distinction from others.

The fundamental relation of God to other selves in Howison's system is ethical. He is not supreme as an Absolute, but rather one of the many and at times it seems as if he had less power than they. He is finite and impotent in the affairs of mankind just because of his ethical nature which seems to exhaust itself in recognizing and respecting the freedom of the many. The many are uncreated, so do not owe their existence to God. He is not a creative force in the world, an efficient cause, but a final cause in the sense of being the partially abstract Ideal by which human lives are tested and patterned.

But why posit such a God? Why not choose either the atheism of McTaggart or the Absolute of certain idealists? Howison's chief reason seems to be the necessity of providing for freedom. Like Bosanquet he holds that every created being is completely dependent upon his creator. If this be true, he cannot possibly be free "for no being that arises out of efficient causation can possibly be free".[2] He seems to be basing this interpretation of creation on the Leibnizian theory of pre-established harmony. Such a view would lead to a mechanistic interpretation of freedom, yet he rightly rejects such a view as incompatible with morality.

1 Ibid., p. 359.
2 Ibid., p. 332.

The problem of freedom is not yet solved for how can the individual exercise his free will without coming into conflict with that of his neighbor? The result of such a system would be ultimate chaos. The solution offered by Howison is that of reason acting in a reasonable world. He finds the relative determinism which rationality demands perfectly compatible with rational freedom. The argument is that all free individuals possess a rational nature and, therefore, their acts, though not predictable in individual cases, are all in accord with reason and result in harmony and order which seem very like determinism. An optimistic view this certainly is. It is based on the supposition that all minds will act according to the rationality which they possess. This is not always the case and evil results.

Sin is the result of the dual nature of man, the earthly or physical part of him forever warring with the truly rational and God-like. There is no danger of confusing the Supreme Self with any of the Many for they are set off from his perfection by their fraility and tendencies to err. "This union of two antagonistic natures in one individual whole is absolutely foreign to God, the eternal Sum of all Perfections. It belongs, on the contrary, to that non-divine order of existence, --- and it therefore forms an inerasible distinction between the one member of the world of Spirits who realises its Ideal <u>eternally</u>, and all the other possible members."[1]

The goal of activity and freedom is not clearly stated but is implied. It is the development of persons to complete rationality and this, for Howison, is perfect morality. The

[1] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 364.

Complete Reason is Conscience and "in this complete reason, or Conscience, the single spirit sees itself as indeed a person--- a self-active member of a manifold system of persons, all alike self-active in the inclusive unit of their being; all independent centres of origination, so far as efficient causation is concerned, all moving from 'within'," and harminizing their conduct as free members of the 'City of God'.[1]

Development of persons to such rationality is not possible in a limited time. Because of this and because of the very nature of personality, Howison holds that persons are eternal. Universal immortality is the only possible result of such a view of personality. The question of the justice of this is not fully met. Immortality is, of course, a spiritual life, but it is not to be thought of as barren through the absence of sensory experience. Rather is it the richer because of a fuller appreciation of values. It is a serious question whether, for Howison, this future life is sinless because cut off from physical nature which produced its former duality. Living in full rationality might there not be the possibility of breaking down the distinctions between the many and the One?

The system of ethical individualism here sketched leaves certain very definite gaps. The view of persons as eternal raises the question of preexistence. If consciousness is what we hold it to be there would be some memory of such a life yet we have no such memory. Is it not possible that there might be both creation and freedom? Such a view would make conscious life more coherent and, at the same time, add greatly to the character of God.

1 "City of God", in Royce, Conception of God, p. 91f.

The account of the physical world is inadequate. Things merely as the experience of finite minds governed by laws made by these same minds would tend toward the chaotic. What proof is there that my experience will coincide with the experience of any other person, if we are making these laws each for himself? And do the objects of my experience disappear when I am not experiencing them? Berkeley's criticism and argument for God as constant experiencer of the physical world is valid. Howison may accept this but he does not make it evident or use it as a proof of the existence of God.

Howison's emphasis on ethics is good but does not go far enough. He seems to find in freedom and the mutual respect of its rights, the whole story of the moral life. It remains to be seen whether there is not a higher morality to be found in a purposive universe controlled by a God who is responsible for the ultimate outcome of all life. Final causality does not answer this demand completely. Moral values are only a part of the life of value, a significant part, but not the whole.

The greatest addition that Howison makes to the pluralism of McTaggart is in his view of God, not as the Absolute or as on the level of the Many, but as a Supreme Person. This adds content to ethical values, and also to the conception of purpose. The emphasis on the value of individuals as individuals is also better than the insignificance of the one when taken apart from the many as McTaggart would hold. We look, however, for a view which will account for the finite and the infinite even more coherently.

3. Theistic Pluralism.

The third type of pluralistic idealism remains. We have identified it as ethical theism. It is theistic in that God is regarded as the Supreme Person, transcending the world, yet immanent in it; it is ethical in that purpose is the fundamental category, and in that that purpose involves the moral obligation of every individual to realize values. God, who has created free beings, becomes the most completely obligated of all. As Bowne has said: "It was an awful responsibility that was taken when our human race was launched with its fearful possibilities of good and evil. God thereby put himself under infinite obligation to care for his human family; and reflections on his position as Creator and Ruler instead of removing, only make this obligation more manifest."[1]

Hermann Lotze is the real founder of this system in its recent forms. He turned away from the monistic philosophy of Hegel and toward the monadology of Leibniz, to whom he owes much. He opposed any dualistic interpretation of the world and found that the only rational explanation of the experience of interaction between things and spirits must lie in a view of both as ultimately the product of spirit. In common with monism, he held the world ground to be an Absolute. The Absolute was, for him, personal and possessed of all the attributes of perfect personality. God is one God. In him there is perfect unity. He is unchangeable, not because of inactivity, but rather as the result of perfect self-identity and consistency. He is immanent in the world and omnipotent over it. Eternity and

[1] Studies in Christianity, p. 95.

transcendence of space and time limitations also characterize him.

It is not so much the attributes of God as the implications of these for the universe that interest us at present. In opposition to McTaggart and Howison and in common with all members of this group of pluralistic idealists, Lotze accepted the doctrine of creativity. The world is the result of the creative will of the Absolute, but it is not a creation which took place sometime in the past, once and for all. Rather is it a constant, moment by moment, process of creation by an immanent Will. The preservation of the world is, for him, "a continual new-creation".[1] The question might be raised as to the danger of sudden and unpredictable changes in the world as the result of this moment by moment creation. This difficulty Lotze meets with the assurance of the very character of perfect personality. It could not be other than coherent, abiding by its own rational laws. Nature itself is not self-sufficient or indestructible but appears so because of the divine creativity which is constant. "The entire interior consistency of the cohering order of nature, upon which the natural sciences are supported, is conceded as a matter of fact; but taken as a whole and at large it is regarded as a system of mutually conditioning actualities, utterly dependent upon the divine power; so that ultimately, therefore, the World does not preserve itself but is preserved by God."[2] He is opposed to the mechanical interpretation of nature and finds the final purpose of a rational Being the truer explanation of the facts.[3]

[1] Outlines of Philosophy of Religion, p. 92.
[2] Ibid., p. 94.
[3] Outlines of Metaphysics, p. 115ff.

This world, created by God, is made up of physical things and personal spirits, but his relation to these two orders is somewhat different. Things are entirely "modifications of his being"[1] but finite persons have a relative existence for themselves. "Personality", argues Lotze, "does not depend on the distinction of a me from a not me; it has its basis in pure selfhood--in being for-or-to-self; the personality of God therefore, does not necessarily involve the distinction by God of himself from what is not himself, and so his limitation or finiteness; on the contrary 'perfect personality is to be found only in God, while in all finite spirits there exists only a weak imitation of personality; the finiteness of the finite is not a productive condition of personality, but rather a hindering barrier to its perfect development.'"[2] In this view of personality Lotze opposes Howison who states that neither Absolute nor finite self can define itself except in opposition to the other.

Finite selves are developing beings and achieve selfhood through experience. For this development a knowledge of other things outside themselves is necessary. Here Lotze becomes a critic of Leibniz and shows the inadequacy of monads without windows. It is only through their relation to the Absolute that this need can be met. The Absolute has the ability to make such experience possible and finite persons recognize this power "which works through and through them, and, without their own assistance, prescribes for them the universal forms

[1] Outlines of Philosophy of Religion, p. 66.
[2] Uberweg, History of Philosophy, vol. II. p. 320.

of their spiritual activity, their sensation, imagination, judgment, etc.; and which permits them only within narrow limits to dispose further of this dowry, and to pursue their special ends. That is to say, therefore: 'Personality' is in <u>them</u> only very imperfectly accomplished."[1]

Like Howison, Lotze lays stress upon the ethical though he does not develop it so fully. He, however, finds no inherent inconsistency between freedom and individual creation. Mere 'being for self' is not a sufficient attribute of independent beings. They must also be creators in whom there is possibility of changing God's plan. Only so can there be real morality and the problem of evil is largely explained by this fact. The concept of value is here fundamental. Only a teleological ethics which expresses the aim of God as being the development of true character through self-direction can give satisfaction. The divine government is one of justice and opportunity.

In the philosophy of Lotze we have a real synthesis between the many and the One. He conceives of the One as a person and yet not in such a way as to destroy the reality of the many, and he finds in the finite the key to perfect personality rather than a limitation that would make a Supreme Person impossible.

Following Lotze come three thinkers who are close students of his thought and who interpret and carry out its implications. These men are George Trumbull Ladd, James Ward and Borden Parker Bowne. Ward and Bowne studied under Lotze and Ladd is the translator of the series of <u>Outlines</u> taken from the

[1] Outlines of Philosophy of Religion, p. 67f.

lecture courses of Lotze and summarizing his mature thought on the various branches of philosophy.

In general the agreement between Ladd and Lotze is close. The universe, for Ladd, is discoverable through the rational activity of each individual mind. It is found to consist of persons and things. The problem of their relation arises and the only solution which makes them thinkable is that of an Absolute Person. Ladd, like Lotze, tends toward absolutism in this discussion and does not do full justice to the arguments for plurality in the universe, though he recognizes it as a fact. The Absolute is the source of all being and immanent in the whole process of life, yet freedom of finite individuals is an undeniable fact. This is explained by the difference between knowing and willing. God may know all about my actions but my will is my own and he is not responsible for what I do with it.

Ladd agrees with Lotze in his philosophy of nature, attributing to things the same characteristics as to selves. He seems to remain in doubt as to how far down the scale of reality selfhood extends. The unity among things is attributed to the World Ground. "Viewed in its ontological aspect," he says, "all growth of man's scientific discoveries reveals the Being of the World-- as a unity of Force, that is constantly distributing itself amongst the different beings of the world so as to bestow upon them a temporary <u>quasi</u>-independence, while always keeping them in dependent inter-relations, for the realization of its own immanent ideas. But this is to make Nature pre-eminently Self-like; it is <u>the</u> Nature which serves as the

Ground of all the world's self-like things."[1]

The World Ground is Absolute Person, or, as he elsewhere says, Personal Will. This Absolute Person is God, the moral ruler of the universe as well as its sustaining cause. God is the same power or force that works through nature and also through the moral will of the individual. He is self-limited by his own character but by nothing outside himself.

Ward is in even closer harmony with Lotze, in part due to the similarity of their academic preparation. Both began with a study of physiology and the interest in this branch of knowledge is prominent. Both emphasize the close connection between science and philosophy and both develop the empirical method. Ward has sometimes been called the English Lotze.

Ward sketches in his preface to the Realm of Ends the basic elements of the position he defends. "This world immediately confronts us not as one Mind, nor even as the manifestation of one, but as an objective whole in which we discern many minds in mutual interaction. It is from this pluralistic standpoint that our experience has in fact developed, and it is here that we acquire the ideas that eventually lead beyond it. For pluralism, though empirically warrented, we find defective and unsatisfactory: but the theism to which it points is only an ideal--an ideal however that, as both theoretically and practically rational, may claim our faith though it transcend our knowledge."

Ward begins with the experience of individual selves and finds that the distinction in their consciousness between subject and object leads inevitably to pluralism. Not only are

[1] Ladd, Knowledge, Life and Reality, p. 223.

there many things and selves beyond the one subject, but he recognizes within himself a multiplicity of lesser selves which are in mutual intercommunication. Such facts of consciousness as dissociation and the subconscious are explained by these lesser selves. In taking the step from the many to the One, Ward finds the view of the Absolute inadequate. The Absolute is a totality but not a true unity. "There might have been an Absolute, provided there had been no Many, but holding to the reality of these we can regard God as supreme, but not as absolute: then we seem to save the Many but we have only a 'finite God' or rather the idea of one."[1] Without an Absolute the problem of accounting for the meaning and unity of the universe seems almost hopeless; with the Absolute plurality is endangered.

Pluralism begins with the many, as Ward repeatedly reminds us, and ends with the many, but the question is whether this is the true beginning and end or whether there may not be both lower and higher limits; a fundamental ground and an ultimate end. Such a ground we may find in God, the creator of the many and of the natural world in which they live. In him also we find the moral ends toward which the many move.

Such a view does not deny evolution though it is contrary to certain theories of evolutionary development. The process is one of creative synthesis in which new factors are constantly entering, not a preformism in which nothing can be evolved which was not first involved. Natural selection may, and does, account for many factors in the development of the species but it is not sufficient to account for all. The mind of man is

[1] Realm of Ends, p. 43.

not explained by it. Even as man changes the course of development in plants and animals by the use of intellect, so the existence of man as a new being, quite different from the brute life that preceded him, is not to be considered merely the result of natural selection but rather is "to be attributed to a similar interference of some superior or supreme intelligence."[1]

Creation is incompatible with freedom only when it is considered as a process taking place in the dim past when by fiat all that ever is to be was determined. If creation is a continuous process and the creatures are also creators there is no good reason for denying the possibility of freedom. For Ward freedom is an established psychological fact. It is not a limitation upon God for it is the realization of his ethical nature which includes the respect for the realm of ends because it is his end.

Theism and pluralism end at the same point: God is love. Ward beautifully sums up this thought in his closing paragraph. "The world is God's self-limitation, self-renunciation might we venture to say? And so God is love. And what must that world be that is worthy of such love? The only worthy object of love is just love: it must then be a world that can love God. But love is free: in a ready-made world then it could have no place. Only as we learn to know God do we learn to love him: hence the long and painful discipline of evolution, with its dying to live--the converse process to incarnation--the putting off the earthly for the likeness of God. In such a realm of ends we trust "that God is love indeed, and love creation's final law.'"[2]

1 Ibid., p. 91.
2 Ibid., p. 453.

Bowne, the third of the present group to be considered, popularized the Lotzean ideas in an original manner and applied to the system the name 'personalism'. The significance of this system is being felt more and more widely as his students carry out and build upon his thought. He was a student of Lotze and was greatly influenced by him but turned more definitely to pluralism. His thought is also very similar to that of Ward, but Bowne lays more stress on the unity of the World Ground and the immanence of God in nature.

In his Theism Bowne states that there are three possible approaches to knowledge of reality.[1] One may start by doubting everything that can be doubted. This method has often been adopted by philosophy but it leads only to barren speculation. One may, on the other hand, believe everything that has not been proved false. This method leads to many fruitful conclusions but there still remain facts for which there is no proof or disproof. Many of the most significant facts of experience belong in this class and Bowne asserts that these may be accepted as postulates of the practical reason until such time as proof or disproof arrive. Like Kant, he recognizes the limitation of pure reason in accounting for all the facts of experience.

In considering our experience the first question is how we can know the universe and what our observation tells us about it. This is the problem of objective cognition. Bowne makes this include the problems of interaction, law and system.[2] Interaction is a regular process and implies the second factor

[1] p. 11ff.
[2] Theism, p. 47ff.

which is law. The laws are constant and the interaction is uniform. They seem to work together in a system. "The specific nature of the laws and the system is, indeed, a problem for solution; but the existence of rational law and system is implicitly assumed."[1] The starting point of thought "is the conception of things interacting according to law, and forming an intelligible system." Intelligence is basic. As Bowne elsewhere says; "If we seek a tenable theory of knowledge we find it only as we reach a basal intelligence. If we seek to bind the many together in an all-embracing system, it is possible only in and through intelligence. If we seek for unity in being itself we find it only in intelligence. If we seek for causality and identity in being we find it only in intelligence. If we would give any account of the intelligible order and purpose-like products of the world, again intelligence is the only key."[2] Intelligence is not to be thought of as impersonal. All intelligence is owned by some person,[3] and the intelligence that explains the universe is the intelligence of a Supreme Person. "Theism is the fundamental postulate of our total life."[4]

Bowne argues the case convincingly against naturalism and pantheism. He shows that any view of the universe as simply a blind system of necessity is irrational. We find system and order and rationality in the world and yet naturalism assumes that these are caused by irrational power and purposeless necessity. Pantheistic views are no better for, as we have already seen, they do not account for the facts of error and ignorance,

[1] Ibid., p. 49.
[2] Metaphysics, p. 111.
[3] Personalism, p. 253ff.
[4] Theism, p. iv.

and for the characteristics of finite personality.

McTaggart argued that atheism was consistent with a high type of morality. Bowne shows that atheism leads to moral skepticism. True, it is my duty to do what I think I ought to do, but how do I know that it is more than my opinion unless I believe there is a supreme moral law and purpose. But these can exist only in a person. Mere conscientiousness is the only aim for the atheist. Yet "a worthy moral aim can be found only in the thought of a kingdom of righteousness and blessedness realized in a community of moral persons. But no one can work with this aim without implicitly assuming a higher power, which is the guarantee of the possibility of its realization."[1]

Creation for Bowne fulfills rather than destroys freedom. Creation is, for him, not making out of pre-existent material but causative creation in which something entirely new and separate comes into existence. The unity of the universe is to be interpreted as one of purpose rather than of indivisibility. It is the purpose of God to create something other than himself.

4. Pluralistic Solutions.

The philosophy of pluralistic idealism or personalism is being developed by many thinkers in the present day. It is now our purpose to summarize the solutions which this philosophy offers to the problems which have been raised.[2]

[1] Theism, p. 251.
[2] In summarizing the position of present day pluralistic idealism the writer is influenced by the thought of Dr. Edgar S. Brightman, of Boston University.

The first problem is that of the world of nature. The results of the sciences and of philosophy point to the same conclusion as to physical things. Science, in opposition to naive realism, finds things to be made up of active particles exhibiting force or energy as their fundamental quality. Philosophy finds that "the system of things is active like a mind; changes, like a mind; is coherent and rational like a mind; and within limits, mind can use it."[1] Berkeley and Lotze suggest what Bowne and Brightman carry out, the view that physical things are the active experience of just one mind, the mind of God. The advantage of this view lies in the fact that it meets the difficulties left by other theories and makes the world of nature intelligible. The problem of dualism is avoided by showing the ideal nature of things. The monadological view of nature is still accepted by some, and, strange to say, some monists hold this pluralistic view of nature.[2] This theory states that nature is possessed of mind though of a much lower order than that of animals or man. There are inherent difficulties in this view. If nature is all mind, does every atom have a separate soul, or only larger groups of atoms? How does it happen that the whole world of nature works together so perfectly if it really is made up of so many individuals? The fundamental objection is that there is very little value in adopting such a conclusion on the facts we now possess. It may be true but it is a fruitless hypothesis. The view of all of nature as the experience of one mind is simpler and more coherent. It may well be accepted till further facts appear since it adds to the understanding of experience.

[1] Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 122.
[2] Calkins, Persistent Problems of Philosophy, p. 429ff.

Quite evidently things are nothing for themselves but only real as they become part of the experience of some self. Our next problem will then be to establish the meaning of this term 'selfhood'. A self is a conscious unity of self-experience, "a synthesizer of unity and multiplicity."[1] A self is not a broken fragment but a whole, however low in the scale of selves it may be. Yet it is not a simple whole made up of few experiences. Rather does it draw within the unity of an organizing reason the greatest multiplicity of experiences.

All pluralistic idealists hold that there are many finite selves. This conclusion is the direct consequence of their acceptance of immediate experience and the empirical method.

There is difference of opinion as to the origin of these many selves and their relation to the universe as a whole. McTaggart, for instance, denies the existence of a Supreme Person and finds the many to be so completely interdependent that every part is necessary for the whole and completely determined by it; but the whole is no more than the sum of its parts, it has no being for itself but is merely a social organism. Howison postulates a God as the final cause of the universe but denies him any constant creative activity or efficient causation. Finite selves are co-eternal with God and find in him the perfect ethical ideal but not the dynamic source of their existence.

For the pluralistic followers of Lotze the conclusion is quite otherwise. The Supreme Person is the source and ground of the universe. We have found in him the necessary explanation of things. In him also is the solution of the problem of finite

[1] Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 192.

selfhood. The many finite selves, though relatively independent, are created and maintained by the Supreme Self. Modern thought here follows Lotze closely in its view of creation as the constant activity of the Immanent Will. Not a far-off God, but a Force, as Ladd would say, working perpetually as the sustaining power beneath existence.

The facts of human experience draw us away from conclusions which might seem to point toward absolutism. The difficulties of that system have already been recognized. Separateness and privacy are as real facts of finite experience as dependence and limitation. My consciousness is my own and a part of no other person's experience except as I choose to reveal it. Error and ignorance are accounted for without attributing them to God. If I have an existence for myself, and if this existence is limited by the imperfection of my instruments of communication and understanding, I may make mistakes, and I shall certainly never grasp the truth about all reality. If, on the other hand, I were part of the Absolute consciousness it is difficult to see why I should be ignorant of anything that goes on it it. It is of the nature of mind to be a whole, and for each part to know the whole. Experience proves that we do not know the whole of the Absolute Mind and it is unreasonable to hold that we are part of it. Theistic idealism, as Brightman has said, "interprets reality as a society of persons; there is one Supreme Person, in and for whose thought and will all physical things exist so that they are nothing apart from him. The functioning of his conscious will is their being; their matter and energy is his conscious purpose concretely

expressed. Finite persons also depend on his purpose for their being, yet their being is self-conscious and relatively self-determining; not identical with his consciousness, as is the being of physical things. In finite selves, the Supreme Person wills the existnece of what is genuinely other than himself; so that the universe is ultimately a society of selves, not a single self. For absolutism, God is all that there is; for personalism, God is not all there is,--human persons are no part of him."[1]

Pluralism gives meaning and value to the individual. Freedom is possible for beings that have a relative independence of their creator. With freedom comes the possibility of moral choice, and the problem of moral evil. Absolutism solves the problem by denying that evil is really evil, yet the problem remains. Some have solved the problem by saying that God is finite and impotent to prevent the evil which men will. Such a view is better than one which holds that he wills all the evil in the world. It gives hazard and adventure, scope to the moral question, worth to the individuals as co-partners with God in the struggle for the best; but is this enough?

Instead of saying that God is finite may we not say that he is limited, both by the laws of reason and by his fundamental purpose. It is of the nature of personality to be able to impose laws upon itself. God, by his very character, must be loyal to the laws which he thus imposes. They must be perpetual and unvarying. His whole life and the life of every person in his universe must be directed by some purpose

1 Ibid., p. 246.

if we are to find meaning in life. God's purpose in the universe, interpreted in the highest terms we can conceive, must be "soul-making". It is not in harmony with any lofty ideals to create a race of puppets without wills, "robots" who act mechanically but blindly. But the creation of moral beings with the power to choose good and evil, to cooperate with God in the realization of cosmic ends or to defy him even to the point of cosmic destruction is a purpose so challenging, so courageous as to grip our vision and inspire reverence. The moral adventure demands freedom for only the man to whom choice is possible is moral. When free beings are created this is an essential limitation of the power of God but a limitation which is self-imposed. We have, not a God in whom all things are perfected, but rather one who needs our help in the perfecting of his universe. He does not will evil but he does leave us free to choose. Evil in the universe exists because he is loyal to the principles and purposes of his nature and will not interfere with man's choices. If they choose badly they must suffer the consequences and he too must suffer with them in their defeat which is also his own. "Personalism makes purpose the fundamental category of personality, human or divine. The purpose of God as revealed in experience is not that the universe shall be eternally and simultaneously perfect; but rather that persons shall have an opportunity to grow. Not static completeness, but development; not a block-universe, but a universe of suffering and growing love---this is the picture that theism presents. The possibility of achievement is as contingent on effort in a personalistic world as it is in a

world of neutral entities, the possibility of failure is as real; on the other hand, the incentive for achievement is greater, the tragedy of failure more poignant."[1] This is no comfortable universe for the cowardly, but it certainly is one which will develop those traits of character which are universally recognized as most ideal.

A word still needs to be said about natural evil. Why is it that man must suffer from disease and earthquakes and floods? Either God is evil or there must be some necessity which binds him. The latter seems most probable. God is a rational being and he has created a world which is ordered by rational principles. God, by his very character, must be loyal to the laws which he thus imposes. They must be perpetual and without shadow of turning if they are to work for final good. Natural laws cannot be broken for individuals, but individuals are given minds in order that they may learn these laws and use them rather than be destroyed by them.

An impersonal view of reality fails to account for our experiences as persons; a mechanistic interpretation of the process of life denies the facts of purpose which are essential to all thinking; a view of the world as ultimately one being denies the facts of individual experiences of privacy and freedom. The view of pluralistic idealism, holding that there is one Supreme Person, the creator of the many finite persons who are of true value as members of a Kingdom of Ends, the Cosmic Purposer whose character guarantees the ultimate realization of values; this view offers the most reasonable solution to the problems which confront us.

[1] Ibid., p. 334f.

III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PLURALISTIC IDEALISM FOR THE AIMS OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.

In stating at the outset the aims of religious education it was necessary to define the religion in terms of which we were to educate. We defined it as "that type of personal life characterized by faith in and the feeling of dependence on God, and dominated by the will to cooperate with him in the conservation and increase of values."[1] The chief factors in this definition are persons and values. God is recognized as the source of power and as worthy of trust; and his supreme aim is seen to be the conservation and increase of values. The religion of the many persons is a living faith; willing and significant cooperation, and creative activity.

A. A Philosophical Evaluation of Religion.

The problem which now confronts us is what philosophy has to say about this credo of religion? We shall consider first the meaning of personality for religion.

1. Persons and Religion.

Naturalism or materialism is that type of philosophy which holds that matter is all that there is and that its laws explain everything that it is necessary to know about the universe and ourselves. The laws of naturalism are completely mechanistic; the only persons possible are biological organisms;

1 Cf., p. 6.

their experience is limited to sense perceptions of a material world and nothing can be known which is beyond it. What implications has such a view for religion?

In the first place there could be no God unless we could find some cosmic biological organism which could be experienced through the senses. There admittedly is no such being and the naturalist substitutes Humanity as the object of his worship. Finite persons as biological organisms are little more real than God. Consciousness is only the way in which the body acts, and is no more when the body dies. Persons can know things and other persons as perceived in the external world but they can know nothing of ideals and values. Not only is freedom impossible in a mechanistic universe, but so also is all thought. Everything is caused by what preceded it with absolute necessity and the motions of matter which are called thought are as thoroughly determined as the similar motions that are called conduct. There can be no purpose, not even the purpose to think and to know the truth.[1] If this be the truth, the religion of our definition is destroyed for it is based on personal relations to a personal God. Faith, feeling and will are aspects of personal consciousness; and how can there be cooperation between completely determined beings and a non-existent God?

Our study of the philosophy of naturalism led to the conclusion that it is based on a partial view of the world and that the facts of mind are entirely ignored. We discovered that mind rather than matter was ultimate and that things had existence only for minds as parts of their experience. We also

1 Cf. Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, Ch. VIII

found that mechanistic laws were interpreted and used by minds which were teleological.

Our consideration of personality as ultimate led us to another possible view, that of absolute idealism which holds that the universe is just one Supreme Being or Absolute and everything else is part of him. Such a view is much richer in possibilities for religion. Personality, which is essential to religion, is also the inner nature of the universe. God as a personal being is possible, though not all absolutism accepts such an interpretation of the Absolute. The many persons are also admitted as parts of God and as expressing his purpose. The fact of their dependence is most evident. Religion is perfectly possible under such a view but not the religion of our definition and for the following reasons:

Absolutism, in common with naturalism destroys the possibility of freedom and so of cooperation for parts of an Absolute consciousness must be completely dependent on the will of the Absolute. He may see values in persons and will to increase and conserve them but obviously the many partial selves can have no will of their own.

Absolutism is also contrary to our understanding of personality for no person can be part of another, even of the Absolute. Consciousness is essentially private and unique. Worship of the Absolute would be partial self-worship.

Another serious objection to the pantheistic religion of absolutism is that it makes God responsible for all the evil in the world. A God who wills evil cannot be the perfect source of values and the moral ideal.

We finally turned to pluralistic idealism for a truer explanation of the facts of experience in general. It also gives a more satisfactory interpretation of religious experience. For pluralistic idealism personality is ultimate, even as for absolutism, but we have a new interpretation of the relation between God and man. God does not include within himself finite selves, though he is the author of their being and its conserving force. In them he has permitted, nay willed, the existence of something truly other than himself. This view of reality and the view of religion which we have posited seem to be in close harmony. Religion is the free devotion of persons to a Personal God on whom they feel dependent for most, but not all, the facts of their experience, and in whom they have faith. They are free to choose his will or their own but the religious attitude is voluntary cooperation with him in a life of true worth.

The advantages of this as a philosophy of religion lie in the facts that God is immanent in his world and yet not determining every action; that he is a moral being, realizing definite purposes through his relation with men but not responsible for their evil and ignorant actions; and that he is a true individual, separate from all other individuals, yet capable of entering into the most intimate relations of communion and fellowship, and supremely worthy of the humble worship that can be given only to a just and holy Person by a free and loving child. The values of man and of God are recognized without destroying the unity of the whole.

2. Values and Religion.

The second factor in our definition is the conservation of values. For naturalism the matter of values must obviously be omitted for it can consider only those facts which are presented to the senses. All values are supersensuous, and yet they can exist only in the experience of some person. Absolutism provides the possibility for value experience in the whole and in the parts. It recognizes the worth of individuals as members of the whole and gives a meaning to the universe as the home of values. There are, however, limitations in this view of values and particularly of moral values. Considering the facts of experience which point to the destruction of many values how can we point to the Absolute as the cause of all and yet as perfect goodness? Evil is an unpleasant but undeniable fact of experience, and it seems to destroy much of the value of life is absolutism is accepted.

Thus even the problem of the conservation of values points to pluralistic idealism as the most adequate solution. For it every person is of unique value and capable of rich value experiences. Yet finite persons recognize that their values are only fragmentary and incomplete. They never fully attain unto the ideal. Values are objective as well as subjective. They are universally accepted by all reasonable minds and, as Sorley and Brightman show, they can be formed into a coherent system. This system could not exist in any finite mind and yet values are nothing apart from some mind. The contradiction is solved when we interpret them as "the experiences

of a mind beyond all human individuals and societies"[1] the mind of God. Not only are values conserved by God and man, but they are constantly increased by both. Part of the eternal purpose of God is that men should grow through their own efforts to those higher realms of value which are a part of his self-revelation.

Values for naturalism are merely desired objects judged by no supernatural ideals. For absolutism values would seem to be static if the logic of the position be carried out. True, the parts may come to a fuller knowledge of the values which already exist in the whole but it is hardly possible that new values could be created by what is already perfect. Pluralism finds the fundamental purpose of God to be the creation of new values and of new creators. Here infinite development is not only possible but necessary and immortality is just another stage of value-seeking.

B. Implications for Religious Education.

The results of pluralistic idealism which affect the aims of religious education are two: Personality is the ultimate reality in the universe; and, Values are conserved. We have seen what these factors mean for religion; let us now see what changes they will make in religious education.

1. Personality is Ultimate.

First, then, let us consider the assertion that personality is ultimate. For religious education this means two

1 Ibid., p. 163.

things: that God is a personal being and supreme, and that all the rest of reality is made up of persons, finite but like him. If naturalism were true, religious education would be possible but unreasonable. Much of current education is based on this theory. It says that the child is a little animal, the result of organic evolution and moulded by external forces. Education consists in the presentation of the many facts of life to the child so that he may learn useful reactions and habits which will work for self-preservation and adjustment. Dr. Athearn says that this kind of life is symbolized by the wheel which rolls in the direction of least resistence. It is the life of contentment and acceptance of what is. Religious education, we have said, aims not at what is but at what ought to be; at the ideal society which is possible rather than at the imperfect social conditions which now are.

Idealism which recognizes personality as ultimate may be symbolized, he says, by the Cross which is the sign of change in environment; struggle, suffering, victory. For the idealist the person is lord over matter. In personality there is creative power, self-direction, capacity to reorganize environment in the light of ideals. Religious education, to the idealist, is the presentation of ideals to a personality which has within it the power to imitate the ideal, to judge between ideals, and to create new ideals as increased knowledge brings new visions.

Another implication of the ultimacy of personality is that, if the universe is entirely made up of persons, it is of

paramount importance what sort of persons they are. For naturalism it would make very little difference what sort of training is given for persons are believed to be unable to change their nature or environment. For absolutism there is opportunity for vast growth in knowledge,till the perfection of the Absolute is encompassed. Knowledge, then, must be given by religious education if the finite person is ever to know the wonders of the whole. But even here we have not the moral ideal which comes from the pluralistic view of freedom, choice and cooperation. Children come into the world with plastic natures and possibilities of either good or evil. Their bodies will become the tools of their minds and will be moulded by whatever ideal they choose. It is the duty and privilege of the religious educator to present ideals and motives in such a compelling way that they will be chosen and followed. The automaton without mind is incapable of acting beyond the habits and reactions which have been taught him. The child who is a true person is capable of understanding ideals and applying them to new situations. Every normal person is able to judge between ideals and many different ones should be at his command. Ideals should not be tied to a single situation as is necessary if behaviorism is the whole truth. Rather they should be taught as general principles for minds have the capacity to understand the principles and to apply them to concrete situations. In the presentation of ideals to children and young people the religious educator must remember that they are growing personalities and the method of teaching must be suited to the age. Ideals cannot be presented to children,

and probably not to adults, merely as intellectual assertions. As Dr. Athearn has said, no ideal is safe which is not shot through with emotion and backed up by will.

If the kind of universe is to be determined by the people who make it up it is not safe to allow chance and nature to determine the ideals they will choose. The universe can be improved only as fast as individuals are taught to exercise control in terms of ideal motives. The undisciplined life is immoral and the result of our failure to teach the sterner facts of life will be a chaotic universe of conflicting personailties. Religious education must teach self-control and offer ample opportunity for the practice of this virtue if its aims are to be realized.

Finally we must consider the implications of the pluralistic view of God for the aims of religious education. God is held to be a Supreme Person, the ground and sustaining cause of the entire universe. He is the creator of finite persons and the co-worker with them in the creation of values. His fundamental purpose is the cooperative attainment of values through the development of human beings. God is a spirit and religious education must solve the problem of teaching the child to know the Supreme Spirit if he is to avoid the suffering of later years when reason will no longer permit him to hold what Bowne calls the "corporeal" view of God. In evaluating religious education Dr. Brightman says; "The only significant results, in the end, are in the type of personal relation to God that is developed. Does the child regard God as his

Father, and his King, whom he loves and reveres, who has a right to a cooperative interest in every activity of life? Does the child see home and school, work and play as something in which God has a part, and in which God and he are working together?"[1] Not only children but all learners of religion need this attitude toward God. Their relation to God should be one of loving cooperation, obedience and reverence, even as God's relation to them is cooperation, justice and respect. Religious education has tended to over-emphasize the loving-kindness of God and to forget the justice that rolls down like a mighty stream. Perfect love is compatible only with holy and righteous character and religion must include this element or it will train a generation of moral and spiritual weaklings.

2. Values are Conserved.

Again we turn to the matter of values, and learn that they are conserved and that this conservation has meaning for religious education.

The values of individuality are conserved by pluralistic idealism. Every person is unique and has a significant task to perform. Every individual is a home of values and a creator of new values. Other views deny part or all the value of personality. Absolutism finds the only value of finite persons to be in their relation to the whole. They have no true value in themselves. They are entirely subordinated to the social values. Naturalism in practice does not deny all value

[1] "The Personal Relation Between God and Children", Religious Education, Feb., 1921, p. 28.

but views it as a social and temporary matter. On naturalistic principles there could be no possibility of conservation of personal values after death. Immortality is recognized, however, by pluralism as not only a possibility but a probability because of the very nature of personality and its need of endless time for the realization of values. The religious educator who is interpreting life from the standpoint of pluralism finds that every individual is of true value and his responsibility is to even the least of these. He is training lives that are to go on forever and he must consider what values are worthy of endless development.

The values of morality are conserved by our view. Naturalism and absolutism we have found, deny the possibility of morality by making freedom impossible. As we have shown, freedom is essential to true education and to all moral conduct. The religious educator must build upon the moral character of God expressed in his relations to the world. Morality also demands eternal development for our ideals are always beyond our attainment.

The values of reason and coherence are conserved by our view. Religion, as we have seen, is the natural outcome of pluralistic idealism. It is based on the most reasonable interpretation of our experience taken as a whole. Religious education may aim at the well-rounded development of the individual without fear that it is aiming at the improvement of the non-existent, or that it is based on fiction and fancy.

Finally, spiritual values are conserved by a view of

the universe as personal. From the standpoint of religion these are the most significant values of all. God may be found in many ways. He is revealed in the world of nature with all its beauty, order and mystery. He is known through other persons who have in them some of the likeness of the perfect. He is known through thought and reason as one faces the problems of experience. But he is known most perfectly through that mystic spiritual communion which we call worship. Once more we turn to other views to see if they can meet our needs. For naturalism the spiritual life is a myth; worship and prayer are to be explained as "motions of psychic atoms" or as "sub-vocal mutterings" of the organism. There is no God; there is no true personality; there can be no free worship of an unseen Being. For absolutism worship is reverence by a part of the whole in which it is included. In this view the individual is lost, submerged in the whole. It is well represented by certain eastern religions where the mystic element is so great that the aim is self-absorption into the Infinite. This denies the values of individuality which we have just asserted.

But worship need not lead to annihilation. If our philosophy be true it leads rather to self-development. In the experience of worship the heart is opened to God and ready for new understanding. God cannot reveal himself except to the receptive heart[1] and worship creates this receptivity which is the preliminary step. Worship, as Dr. Bfightman has shown[2] creates new values within the individual; perspective, idealism

[1] Brightman, Lectures.
[2] Religious Values, Ch. IX.

power; and also turns individuals into creators of new spiritual values through the more perfect knowledge of God. Worship does not deny the demands of life and experience but rather returns the individual to his other life better able to meet its needs and understand its complexities. It is not a divisive factor, destroying social relations but a unifying bond which, as Rufus Jones has said,[1] draws together the many factions in a common experience of worship.

[1] "Worship as a Unifying Force." Religious Education, Oct., 1925.

SUMMARY.

The ultimate aim of religious education was said to be Christian character expressed in right relations to God and to one's fellowmen. This aim involves the development of every person to the point where he is capable of such fellowship and such cooperation. We have examined the various interpretations of experience and have reached the conclusion that pluralistic idealism is the most coherent account of the universe as a whole. We have considered the relations of this system to our view of religion and have found that it supports a religious interpretation of the universe. We have shown some implications which this philosophy has for the aims of religious education. Our conclusion is that religious education is justified in aiming at the all-around development of every individual person, and in the training of persons for eternal fellowship with a Personal God.

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